---
author:
- Malcom Ferdinand
date: 2026-09-04
lang: en
rights: "CC BY-NC-SA 4.0,
  https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/deed.fr"
source: "https://plurivers.net/revue-plurivers-1/climate-justice-for-overseas-territories.html"
subtitle: Decolonizing climate change by action from France
title: Climate justice for overseas territories
---

::: traducteurices
Translated from French by Marguerite Morley
:::

::: biography
I was born in Martinique and lived there until I was 18 years old, in
the towns of Rivière-Pilote and Schœlcher. Martinique is a former French
colony. Its society and countryside are marked by the history of
colonial conquest, genocide of Indigenous peoples, transatlantic slave
trade, colonial slavery and other forms of forced labor. I have also
lived in several European countries. I now reside in Paris. As a Black
man from a middle-class family, I have experienced situations of
dominance stemming from structural racism and from the colonial
relationships that the French state maintains with its former colonies.
At the same time I have been spared certain types of gender and class
violence. My life experience in Martinique and in the postcolonial
patriarchal and Christian societies of Europe, structured by social and
racial domination of some over others, have shaped my civic commitments
and the themes of my academic research. I am presently a researcher at
the French National Center for Scientific Research (Centre National de
la Recherche Scientifique, CNRS), and cofounder and president of the
Third World Observatory. My research converges at the intersection of
the philosophy, history and politics of contemporary environmental and
ecological issues, and the philosophy, history and politics of the
colonial legacy of the modern world. Some of my work has been published
in *Une écologie décoloniale: penser l'écologie depuis le monde
caribéen* (Seuil, 2019). Today my research focuses on the history of
environmental thinking and political ecology, and on various
environmental conflicts in Caribbean countries, from the use of
pesticides to climate change.
:::

::: note
A portion of this article is drawn from an earlier article published in
2018. Ferdinand, Malcom, "Subnational Climate Justice for the French
Outre-mer: Postcolonial Politics and Geography of an Epistemic Shift,"
*Island Studies Journal,* 2018, vol. 13, p.119-34.
:::

From the United Nations Framework Conference on Climate Change in Rio de
Janeiro in 1992 (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto agreement in 1997, to the Paris
Agreement of 2015 and the annual Conferences of the Parties (COP), the
scientific community, political ecology movements and the
representatives of Indigenous peoples have unceasingly enjoined
nation-states to limit their global emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG).
These pleas cannot be dissociated from the call for recognition of the
historical discrepancies of emissions, notably between the global North
and the global South, and of the unequal and unjust consequences of
climate change.[^1] The reports issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) show that climate change has a particularly strong
impact on the countries of the South, on poor countries and on
women.[^2] Likewise, in her report to the General Assembly of the United
Nations on 25 October 2022, Tendayi Achiume, special reporter to the
United Nations Human Rights Commission, underscored that racism is a
central element underlying climate injustice and more broadly the global
ecological crisis.[^3]

In this paper I raise the question of climate injustice and inequality
recognized around the world, from the vantage point of France. France
likes to cultivate its image as the birthplace of human rights, and as a
country on the front lines of the battle against climate change, citing
its key role in the Paris COP 21, or Emmanuel Macron's retort to Donald
Trump, "Make our planet great again" in 2017, among others. And yet
France is also a country sanctioned in October 2021 for failing to
fulfill its climate commitments.[^4] France is also regularly singled
out for police racism and violence, by both the national advocate for
citizens' rights,[^5] and by the United Nations.[^6] In this context I
particularly want to examine the meaning of climate justice toward and
emanating from the territories of this country that have been
marginalized nationally and masked internationally, i.e. the overseas
lands, the *Outre-mer*.

"Climate justice" as used here does not refer to a body of national or
international laws to be enforced with respect to the climate. The
notion of justice is above all the demand for political, social, moral
and legal equality, for fair redistribution and for dignity in the face
of the global imbalance regarding the causes of anthropogenic warming
and the unequal burden of the consequences of this warming. What is the
place given to the overseas territories in the reports issued by French
authorities on climate change and in the conceptual theory and politics
of climate justice?

Following a brief presentation of these territories, two main threads
run through this article. I highlight a number of situations of
inequality and injustice with respect to climate change cited in reports
from overseas territories to central authorities in France, and I
emphasize the need for an approach to climate justice that addresses the
overseas dimension, namely *infranational climate justice*. Secondly, I
defend the idea that the nonsovereign entities of the world such as the
French Outre-mer reveal a theoretical and political impasse in the
thinking of climate justice. A more radical policy is necessary, for
overseas territories, for France and the rest of the world, to
*decolonize climate change.*

# The Outre-mer or the unseen colonial visage of France

Today as in the past, the imaginary territory from which France projects
its thinking, not only about climate change, but the very essence of
France, remains the six-sided bit of European land---the Hexagon---plus
the island of Corsica. The Eurocentric geographical and political
representation of France is the heritage of its colonial and
slave-driven empire, and is apparent in various domains of the country's
national and international politics. Try this experiment: ask anybody in
the world (including in metropolitan France and in its overseas
territories) to locate France on a map. It is taken for granted that the
"correct" answer is the hexagon on the European continent. Even if the
French overseas territories are mentioned or pointed out on the map,
they are paradoxically referred to ways that reinforce the Eurocentric
representation of France: it is said that France "has" or "possesses"
territories in the Indian Ocean, the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans.
Once again, the singular possessing subject "La France" is naturally
found in Europe and embodied by the people who live there. It is never
specified that France "possesses" a European territory. This is one way
to illustrate the geographic and political marginalization of the
Outre-mer in France.

A bit of history: after World War II the French colonial empire was
dismantled under the pressure of political and military action by
colonized people in Africa and Asia who fought for their independence,
starting with Vietnam (1945), then Guinea (1958), Senegal (1960),
Madagascar (1960) and Algeria (1962). The French *Outre-mer* designates
primarily---but not exclusively---the former colonies of the French
colonial empire that has persisted in the national territorial
configuration via a form of decolonization without sovereignty. These
territories are no longer colonies, nor are they independent countries.

![Map of the French overseas territories, produced by Aude Chesnais in
2021.](https://plurivers.net/files/73e4abe21d72feb791f479211a611d2b.webp){width="2048"
height="1312"}

In addition to its territory on the European continent, France comprises
today 12 territories located in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific oceans,
where some 2.6 million people live, making up 3.8% of the country's
total population of 68 million.[^7] Most of these territories are small
densely populated islands no larger than 2,500 square kilometers, with
the exception of New Caledonia (18,575 sq. km.). Martinique, Guadeloupe,
Guyane (French Guiana), Saint-Barthélemy and Saint-Martin (shared with
the Netherlands) are located in the Caribbean Sea in the Atlantic, while
Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon sits just off the coast of Newfoundland in
Canada. La Réunion and Mayotte are in the Indian Ocean. Polynesia, New
Caledonia and Wallis-et-Futuna are French archipelagos in the Pacific.
The islands of these archipelagos are more widely scattered than those
of the Caribbean. Polynesia is made up of 118 small volcanic islands
with mountainous terrain in their center and low plains on the coast.
Other than these islands, Guyane is a territory of 86,000 sq. km. on the
northeastern coast of South America.

The French Outre-mer also includes a set of uninhabited territories
called the French Southern and Antarctic Lands (Terres Australes et
Antarctiques Françaises, TAFF). They are for the most part occupied by
scientific bases and military outposts. Four French archipelagos are
found in the Indian Ocean: the Crozet archipelago, the Kerguelen
Islands, the Scattered Islands (les Îles Éparses) and the islands of
Saint-Paul and Amsterdam. This ensemble also includes the immense
territory of Terre-Adélie (432,000 sq. km.) in Antarctica. Last among
these territories is the uninhabited and very remote island of
Clipperton in the Pacific Ocean. Leaving Terre-Adélie aside, these
overseas territories make up 18% of the land area of France. In
addition, since the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, these lands account for 97% of French
maritime territory, also called the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This
zone of roughly 11 million square kilometers makes France the
second-ranking maritime power in the world, after the United States.

Distinct administrative statuses are attributed to these territories
under the French constitution. The four "old colonies" of Martinique,
Guadeloupe, La Réunion and Guyane, plus Mayotte, are designated as
"Départements et Régions d'Outre-Mer" (DROM) according to the principle
of legislative identity set forth in article 73 of the constitution.
This article states that "the legislation and regulations \[of France\]
are fully applicable by law" in these territories, while specifying that
some adaptations are possible.[^8] The DROM are considered to be an
integral part of the European Union (but not the Schengen Space) under
the 1992 Maastricht treaty, and are counted among the EU's Outermost
Regions, where the laws, requirements and treaties of the EU are
automatically applicable. The "Collectivités d'Outre-Mer" (COM) include
Wallis-et-Futuna, Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, Saint-Martin,
Saint-Barthélemy and Polynesia, and are attributed a special legislative
status that "takes into account the particular situation and needs of
each \[entity\] within the framework of the Republic" as stipulated in
article 74 of the constitution.[^9] Other than certain sovereign domains
of state authority (nationality, civil rights, freedoms, justice and
security) national legislation and regulations are not automatically in
force, unless specified otherwise. These territories are given greater
legislative autonomy than the departments, in matters such as taxation
and maritime customs duties, among others. Polynesia, for instance has
its own legislative assembly, government and president. Since the 1957
Treaty of Rome these territories have been designated as Overseas
Countries and Territories within the European Union. Although these
entities are part of EU member countries, they are not considered to be
part of the European Union. As a result, the laws and regulations of the
EU are not applicable. Nonetheless, as the inhabitants of these
countries are French citizens they are also European citizens, and elect
representatives to the European Parliament. Consequently, EU law applies
to persons in these territories.[^10]

A long series of conflicts between the Kanak people of New Caledonia and
French authorities culminated in 1988 with the abduction of hostages
held in a cave in Ouvéa. In the wake of these events agreements were
concluded to set up a gradual process toward independence for the
territory. The accords, known as the Matignon-Oudinot Agreement (1988)
and the Noumea Agreement (1998) attributed a unique status to New
Caledonia, neither DROM nor COM. The governance of New Caledonia is set
forth in Title XIII of the Constitution. This independence process,
which stipulated three successive referendums, is now in deadlock
because of fundamental differences with the French central government
under President Emmanuel Macron. The central authorities required that
the third referendum on independence be held in 2021, during the
lock-down imposed in France due to the COVID-19 pandemic, flouting the
wishes of the advocates of Kanak independence to honor the dead, and to
postpone the referendum in order to allow campaigning without
pandemic-related sanitary and health restrictions. This final referendum
was boycotted by many, and voter participation was half that of the
previous referendums. The final result, against independence, has not
been accepted by the population of New Caledonia. New Caledonia is also
an Overseas Country and Territory of the European Union.

The composition of the group of French overseas territories has been in
flux since 1946, and further changes are possible in the future.
Political change may come from the peoples of these territories
themselves, as seen in Polynesia, where a pro-independence government
under President Moetai Brotherson was elected on 12 May 2023.
Historically, it is due to the struggles of local independence movements
led by Jean-Marie Tjibaou and Oscar Temaru, among others, that New
Caledonia and French Polynesia were officially (re)listed by the United
Nations as nonautonomous territories to be decolonized.[^11]
Furthermore, French sovereignty over certain territories is disputed.
Comoros lays a claim to the island of Mayotte, considering it to be one
of the four islands of its archipelago. Mayotte was separated from the
other islands by France when Comoros became independent in 1975. At the
time this action by France was condemned by the General Assembly of the
United Nations which declared that "the referendums imposed on the
inhabitants of the Comorian island of Mayotte constitute a violation of
the sovereignty of the Comorian State and of its territorial integrity."
The assembly called upon the government of France "to withdraw
immediately from the Comorian island of Mayotte, an integral part of the
independent Republic of the Comoros, and to respect its sovereignty"
(21 October 1976).[^12] Regarding uninhabited territories, Madagascar
lays a claim to four of the five islands among the Scattered Islands
(Les Glorieuses, Europa, Juan de Nova and Bassas da India). Mauritius
claims the fifth island (Tromelin).

This brief overview of the geographical and political horizons of France
shows that, in contradiction with a colonial and Eurocentric vision,
today France is a territory of multiple locations, spread across three
oceans, and hence cannot be reduced to its continental European entity
alone. The marginalization of the territories situated elsewhere than on
the continent of Europe is not merely the consequence of the geographic
discontinuity of these lands, with distances of several thousand
kilometers between some territories. This marginalization follows and
perpetuates a colonial split, both historical and contemporary, which
distinguishes the hexagonal territory---the former Metropole---from the
overseas lands. The population of "metropolitan" or "mainland" France,
consequence of the structural whiteness of the construction of the
nation forged by the history of the colonial Empire, continues to be
thought of and represented as primarily White.[^13] The overseas
territories, former colonies, are home to people in their majority
thought to be and represented as non-White. The asymmetrical nature of
this configuration is flagrantly visible when the sociopolitical status
of individuals in the socially and racially White group, with their
origins in "metropolitan" France---the so-called "Metros"---who live or
visit the overseas territories, is compared with the status of the
racialized individuals, people of color, with their origins overseas,
who live or visit the European "Metropole." On the one hand, we note the
comfortable economic status of the Metros overseas, their dominant
position in local businesses and markets, their access to high-level
public jobs and over-representation in government administration, in
cultural institutions and scientific research. On the other, we find
discrimination in housing and employment for people of color in
metropolitan France, police harassment on the basis of skin color,
structural racism in the courts, leading to over-representation of
people of color in prisons, to discrimination in access to positions in
higher education, and to the invisibilization of people of color in the
arts, culture and media.[^14] Despite the equal rights of citizenship
promised by the 1946 legislation granting the status of *département* to
certain territories, one can only observe the great social inequality
and infrastructure deficit in the overseas lands that persist today,
perpetuating the fault lines of the colonial period. The inhabitants of
the overseas territories have become citizens of another class.[^15]

The very term of "overseas" is quite literally a French colonial
fabrication, and continues to be contested today. Beginning with
historical variation in the gender accorded to "overseas"---*le* or *la*
*outre-mer*---and designation as a singular or plural
entity---*l'outre-mer* or *les* *outre-mer*---this term raises political
and epistemological issues. The political issues are tied to the fact
that it is difficult, and even violent, for some people in these
territories to hear their homeland called "beyond" the seas, far from
the center, or worse, identified by the associated adjective
"ultramarin" or "ultramarine". The epistemological problem arises in
that by using these terms without questioning them people risk adopting
the colonial perspective they embody. There is also the risk of
obscuring other languages and other ways of naming these lands, i.e.,
reference frameworks other than the historical French colonial
framework, in which people speak of Madinina, of Karukera, Te Ao Ma and
Kanaky, rather than of Martinique, Guadeloupe, Polynesia or New
Caledonia, respectively. At bottom, nowadays only the French state and
government continue to take the term "overseas" for granted. This
absence of questioning is sometimes cloaked in a thick veil of
condescension and derisive allusion to an "exotic" other.[^16]
Nonetheless, this notion remains an administrative category in the
governance of these territories, and as such structures certain aspects
of the daily life of their inhabitants. Even though the appropriateness
of the term is disputed, I use it here, not to accept the underlying
view, but rather to reveal the blind spots and limitations of the term,
and the situations of domination experienced by the inhabitants of these
territories, who, whether they like it or not, are confronted with
global climate change in the context of the legal and political
configuration inherited from the French colonial empire.

# Low greenhouse gas emissions, high exposure

When faced with climate change, the overseas territories are often
caught in a two-pronged vise of marginalization, at the national and
international levels. At the national level, the marginalization of the
overseas in the imagination of France gives rise to discrimination in
many domains---politics, the economy, cultural affairs, and social,
legal and legislative matters. This discrimination, whether hypocritical
or careless, is prejudicial to these territories which give France a
foremost position on the world chessboard. They support, among others, a
military and political presence in three oceans; the development of
France's nuclear power via 193 nuclear tests carried out on the Moruroa
and Fangataufa atolls in Polynesia from 1966 to 1996 (after those
conducted in Algeria); and a strategic position in space exploration
with the Centre Spatial Guyanais (CSG) in Kourou, which serves all of
Europe. And yet, from the 1970s to today, the overseas territories
continue to be a blind spot within the organizations, political parties
and intellectual production of the political ecology movement in
metropolitan France, particularly regarding climate issues. The overseas
territories receive relatively little attention in metropolitan climate
movements such as Youth for Climate and Alternatiba.[^17] But, while
deadly heat waves recur in Europe and in metropolitan France, the
overseas territories are undoubtedly the places in France that are the
most exposed and vulnerable to the consequences of global warming.

Internationally, most climate action and climate justice movements have
focused on the discrepancies between the contributions of individuals or
countries to global warming, and the geographic and sociopolitical
consequences incurred.[^18] Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have
rightly called for distributive justice, as expressed by the powerful
voice of Mia Mottley, prime minister of Barbados.[^19] With the
exception of Puerto Rico, academic publications on climate justice in
the Caribbean have looked primarily at the small insular states, despite
the fact that half of the islands in the region are nonsovereign
territories attached to European states.[^20] Although these islands
represent only 12% of the population in the Caribbean, and 5% of
Caribbean land area, they make up 29% of its maritime territory.[^21] To
address climate change from the standpoint of these overseas
territories, marginalized within their national sphere and invisible on
the international stage, we must look at climate justice from a new
angle, with an *infranational* approach, and we must pay attention to
inequalities across the whole of the national territory as configured by
its colonial history, in this case the Hexagon of metropolitan France
and its overseas.[^22]

The French Overseas faces profound climate injustice. These territories,
which have contributed very little to global warming, are over-exposed
to its consequences. At the same time they suffer from great
vulnerability, constructed over the long term through what I call "the
colonial lifestyle."[^23] By this expression I designate a way of living
on the land and the relationships between the humans and nonhumans of
its ecosystems that have been imposed by modern colonization; a way of
life that exploits all living things and determines the infrastructure
of these territories in order to enrich a handful of shareholders, in
the headlong pursuit of capitalistic endeavors in the service of
metropolitan consumer markets. The table below shows GHG emissions of
French overseas territories (DROM and COM) and of metropolitan France,
and their respective shares in total GHG emissions for France over the
past 30 years.[^24]

+:-------------------:+:--------:+:--------:+:--------:+:--------:+:--------:+:--------:+:--------:+
| **CO2eq/yr (metric  | **1990** | **1995** | **2000** | **2005** | **2010** | **2015** | **2020** |
| tons) (UTCATF)**    |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
+---------------------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| **DROM**            | 9.5      | 15.2     | 14.2     | 15.3     | 16.5     | 16.3     | 15.2     |
+---------------------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| \% of total         | 1.8      | 2.9      | 2.7      | 3.0      | 3.5      | 3.9      | 4.0      |
+---------------------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| **COM+ New          | 3.3      | 3.9      | 3.0      | 4.7      | 5.1      | 6.9      | 5.8      |
| Caledonia**         |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
+---------------------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| \% of total         | 0.6      | 0.8      | 0.6      | 0.9      | 1.1      | 1.6      | 1.5      |
+---------------------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| **Overseas**        | 12.8     | 19.1     | 17.3     | 20.1     | 21.6     | 23.2     | 21.0     |
+---------------------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| \% of total         | 2.4      | 3.7      | 3.3      | 4.0      | 4.6      | 5.5      | 5.6      |
+---------------------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| **Metro France**    | 512.5    | 496.8    | 511.8    | 484.7    | 449.5    | 400.7    | 355.8    |
+---------------------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| \% of total         | 97.6     | 96.3     | 96.7     | 96.0     | 95.4     | 94.5     | 94.4     |
+---------------------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+
| **Total for         | 525.3    | 515.9    | 529.0    | 504.7    | 471.1    | 423.9    | 376.8    |
| France**            |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
|                     |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| (Metro + Overseas)  |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
+---------------------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+

Table 1: GHG emissions in France, 1990-2020 (based on CITEPA data)[^25]

The overseas territories do contribute to global warming. But the level
of emissions is low compared to the rest of France. In 1990, the
reference year for most international climate agreements, the French
overseas territories represented only 2.4% of total emissions for
France. The share of the overseas territories in French emissions has
grown steadily since 1990, and now represents 5.6% of total emissions
for France. As of this writing per capita emissions are higher in the
overseas territories than in metropolitan France: 7.8 metric tons
CO2eq/inhabitant compared to 5.5 metric tons CO2eq/inhabitant. If we
look no further, one might exclaim, "See, the people in the overseas
territories are those who contribute the most to climate change!" It
must be remembered, however, that GHG emissions are the consequence not
only of final consumption, but also of modes of land use, energy
infrastructure and production facilities. By this measure, in 2020 the
overseas territories account for close to one-fifth (18%) of total
national land area, while their GHG emissions represent only 5.6% of
total emissions.

Furthermore, while the increase in GHG emissions overseas contrasts with
the slow decrease in total emissions for France, this increase is not so
much due to different behavior on the part of residents overseas and
those living in metropolitan France, as it is due to distinct types of
energy production. Some ten years ago a parliamentary report had already
drawn attention to the dependence of the overseas territories on fossil
energy.[^26] Another parliamentary inquiry reached the same conclusion
in 2023.[^27] Despite a recent trend away from fossils fuels, all the
overseas territories still depend on fossil resources such as coal and
oil for over 80% of their energy use: 83% in Guadeloupe (2021); 82% in
Martinique (2020); 98% in Mayotte (2020); 81% in French Guiana (2020);
94% in Polynesia (2019); 86% in La Réunion (2022); 96% in New Caledonia
(2021).[^28] All these fuels are imported, and the dependency on fossil
fuels is simply another facet of energy nonsovereignty. Although
environmental conditions are favorable for the exploitation of
hydraulic, solar, wind and geothermal resources, the development of
renewable energy is still lagging in these territories. Fossil energy
use is much lower in metropolitan France, at 46% of total consumption
(2021) due to the dependency on nuclear power (40% in 2021).[^29]

With under 6% of total GHG emissions for France, the overseas
territories are on the front lines when it comes to the consequences of
global warming, due to geographic factors. Most of these territories are
islands in tropical latitudes and have already seen a significant
increase in average temperature. For example, in New Caledonia and in
Martinique, and from 1970 to 2009, the average temperature increases
observed are 1.3°C and 1.44°C respectively, nearly twice the average
global increase for the same period.[^30] During the same time period
the sea level rose at the pace of 3 mm per year.[^31] It is estimated
that the sea level in these lands will rise by between 40 centimeters
and 1 meter by the end of the century.[^32] The landscape of these two
territories are flat plains with low slopes, and a slight vertical
elevation of the sea level is sufficient to cause a significant
horizontal retreat of the coastline, and loss of a substantial amount of
land area. In Martinique it is common to hear the elders of the towns of
Vauclin in the south or Le Prêcheur in the north say that their
childhood homes or the fields where they played soccer are now in the
sea. The consequences of global warming are not limited to the overseas
territories, and the average temperature has risen by 1°C in
metropolitan France. The island geography and small size of these lands,
however, makes loss of land area highly problematic for the social and
economic life of their inhabitants, threatening to submerge roads,
marketplaces, town squares and homes along the coast.[^33]

Geographic factors are also important in relation to hurricanes. While
the overall frequency of hurricanes has not increased with global
warming, the presence of a larger mass of water vapor in the atmosphere
produces heavier rainfall when hurricanes make landfall. The same
relationship holds for rising temperature and higher winds during
tropical storms. We are experiencing not more hurricanes, but more
intense hurricanes.[^34] The dramatic consequences of this trend have
already been seen, with the category 5 hurricanes Irma and Maria that
swept through the Caribbean in 2017, causing particularly heavy damage
in Saint-Martin and Saint-Barthélemy. The increased intensity of
hurricanes also brings a greater storm surge, the temporary rise in sea
level along the coast during hurricanes, such as the surge that caused
destructive flooding in New York City in October 2012.[^35]

Rising sea levels and receding coastlines also have major political
consequences for the peoples of the Pacific. The Fiji writer Epeli
Hau'ofa reminds us that for the many peoples of the Pacific they inhabit
an ocean sprinkled with islands, and not islands surrounded by
ocean.[^36] Receding coastlines can also lead to loss of maritime space.
The maritime domain of countries is determined by measurements drawn
from the coastline, and a receding coastline will shrink the maritime
domain that is so important for these peoples. For this reason, among
others, the Taputapuatea Declaration of the peoples of Polynesia
denouncing the dangers of climate change (July 2015) calls for the lines
of maritime domains to be permanently set, to ensure the future maritime
activity of these territories in the face of climate change.[^37]

These territories are highly exposed to the impacts of global warming,
and their ecological systems are highly vulnerable. The endemic
ecosystems of these territories are located in critical zones for
biodiversity, augmenting the risks associated with climate change. On
the scale of France as a whole, the overseas territories are home to
some 80% of the fauna and flora that constitute natural
biodiversity.[^38] The biodiversity of France is found in the extensive
Amazon forest of Guyane and in the mangroves of Martinique, Guadeloupe
and Mayotte. The largest contiguous forest of the European Union is in
Guyane. Guyane is six times smaller than metropolitan France and is home
to three times as many vertebrate species.[^39] The endemic biodiversity
of France is for 97% found in the overseas territories. Biodiversity is
also preserved in marine locations. The 11 million square kilometers of
France's overseas marine domain are home to 10% of the coral reefs and
20% of the atoll habitats on Earth.[^40] The warming of sea water and
acidification of the oceans endanger these delicate ecosystems.

# Vulnerability induced by the colonial lifestyle

Far from being a natural phenomenon, the vulnerability of these
territories in the face of climate change is the result of the
historical, socioeconomic, geographic and political construction of the
colonial lifestyle.[^41] Since the beginnings of the historical and
colonial edifice, the territories' economic structures have registered
the most alarming social indicators in France, for instance the
unemployment rate, which is two to three times higher than in
metropolitan France. When unemployment reached 7.1% in metropolitan
France in 2022, the rate stood at 13% in Martinique and Guyane, 11% in
New Caledonia, 18% in Guadeloupe and La Réunion, and 34% in
Mayotte.[^42] Only Polynesia has a comparable rate of unemployment, at
9% in 2022.[^43] In 2018 39% of the residents of Mayotte and 77% of the
people in La Réunion lived below the poverty level.[^44] Furthermore,
the calculation methods used by the INSEE statistics bureau tend to
under-estimate the problem.[^45] The cost of living is quite a bit
higher overseas than in metropolitan France. A study in 2020 found that
a typical food basket cost between 39% and 46% more overseas than in
metropolitan France.[^46] In addition there are numerous shortcomings in
the organization of public services that in effect block access to
certain social benefits, as was noted by France's public rights advocate
in 2023.[^47] The persistent inequality between the overseas territories
and metropolitan France was one of the grievances behind the general
strikes in Guadeloupe, Martinique and La Réunion in 2009, in Mayotte and
New Caledonia in 2016, and in Guyane in 2017.[^48] The 2017 legislation
to promote equal treatment for the overseas territories notwithstanding,
inequality continues to be marked.[^49] The quest for "real equality,"
sustaining the decolonization process, remains a core issue in civil
society.

The colonial lifestyle maintains local economies that are structurally
founded on nonsovereignty in terms of food supply for the inhabitants of
overseas territories. The absurdity of the colonial lifestyle with
respect to climate change is most glaring in the cultivation of bananas
in the Antilles islands. Banana plantations suffer heavy damage with
each hurricane of even modest intensity. This sector of agriculture
depends on the resistance of these giant herbaceous plants that are
battered by winds of over 200 km/hour, year after year. Likewise, the
Global Footprint Network estimates that the island of La Réunion, with
an economy based on sugar exports, exceeds its annual biocapacity (the
capacity of ecosystems to replace the resources withdrawn by human
activity) by some 3,200% each year, making this island the territory
with the third largest ecological deficit in the world.[^50] Martinique
and Guadeloupe rank respectively 18^th^ and 21^st^ in terms of
ecological deficit, exceeding their biocapacity by 680% and 590%
respectively. The Antilles islands and La Réunion export thousands of
metric tons of bananas and sugar, but are not able to feed their
inhabitants or ensure the biological renewal of their ecosystems. The
colonial lifestyle also stands out for its nonsovereignty in terms of
energy use---these territories depend on fossil fuels for over 90% of
their consumption.[^51] This means that when hurricanes or other events
prevent oil tankers from reaching the islands, their infrastructure is
plunged into complete paralysis. As seen on Saint-Martin after the
passage of hurricane Irma, the fragility of water supply infrastructure,
nonsovereignty in food and energy supply, compounded by precarious
economic circumstances and poverty, are the ingredients of a catastrophe
waiting to happen with the occurrence of any severe or intense
environmental event.[^52]

Lastly, these territories are exposed to multiple environmental risks in
addition to the consequences of global warming. The emergence of an
underwater volcano off the island of Mayotte has caused the island to
subside, in conjunction with rising sea levels due to global warming.
Martinique and Guadeloupe are also volcanic islands, located in a
subduction zone with regular seismic activity. The two islands have been
durably marked by the chlordecone contamination scandal. This
insecticide compound, officially in use from 1972 to 1993 in banana
plantations, has caused long-term generalized harmful contamination of
ecosystems in the Antilles and damage to human health and habitat.[^53]
The heavy rains of tropical storms and hurricanes often damage water
ducts, allowing chlordecone to infiltrate into water supply systems and
contaminate drinking water.[^54]

# Can the overseas territories speak up in the face of climate change?

In the words of Gayatri Spivak with reference to the subaltern, do the
inhabitants of overseas territories have the political option of
speaking up in the face of climate change?[^55] Are they considered to
be political subjects in their own right, endowed with speech, capable
of expressing their own cosmologies and conceptualizations of climate
issues and their right to participate in national and international
debates? Along with their high exposure to the consequences of global
warming and their ecological and sociopolitical vulnerability, the
French overseas territories are also politically ostracized within the
Republic of France. First, in electoral terms the 2.6 million
inhabitants of these lands have but little weight in French national
politics. More fundamentally, the notion that French overseas citizens
might speak out on national topics other than their own social and
political issues (and even that is not sure) is met with surprise, or is
not readily accepted, in the minds of the residents of metropolitan
France. Inversely, it is taken for granted that the inhabitants,
representatives and elected officials of metropolitan France have every
right to hold forth on the situation in the overseas territories. This
political and symbolic asymmetry is one of the ongoing aspects of the
colonial relationship between the Metropole and the Overseas. It is an
underlying principle of the Ministry of the Colonies, renamed Minister
of Overseas Territories in 1946, a government office that continues to
be physically located in metropolitan France. This asymmetrical
relationship is also at work in the appointment of ministers and deputy
ministers who have no ties with the overseas territories, as is the case
with the ministers serving under President Macron since 2022.

In epistemic terms, this structural, political and symbolic ostracism is
perpetuated in the theoretical understanding of the stakes of global
ecology issues, as they are understood from the vantage point of
metropolitan France, by the activists and militants of French political
ecology movements, environmental movements and in national environmental
policy and politics. The history of the intellectual production of
political ecology movements and of environmental philosophy in France is
notable for its silence on colonial issues and its exclusion of the
voices of overseas scholars. In addition to relegating these voices out
of hearing, out of sight and mind, this latent epistemic racism induces
the failure to recognize other ways of approaching, thinking about,
analyzing, writing about and narrating climate change.[^56]

The singular status of the overseas "collectivités" (COM) in the French
Republic and the ambivalent nature of their attachment to the European
Union replicates these forms of exclusion, at the national and
international levels. On the international stage the overseas entities
are not entitled to their own voice in the climate change debate.
Despite their ecological significance the overseas territories do not
have their own voice at the UNFCCC. Unlike their neighbors---Fiji,
Vanuatu and Tuvalu in the Pacific, Comoros and Mauritius in the Indian
Ocean, Sainte-Lucie, Dominica, Surinam and Haiti in the Caribbean, the
French overseas territories are neither parties to the convention nor
recognized as observers. Officially they are represented by France.

When France signed and ratified the UNFCCC accords in 1992 and 1994 its
agreement included all emissions of its overseas territories. In other
words, France must inform the other parties to the convention of its
progress in GHG reductions for all its territories, including the
overseas "collectivités." At the same time, France's signature of the
Kyoto Protocol was given as a member of the European Union. Thus, as the
COM entities are not included within the European Union, the agreements
and provisions of the Kyoto Protocol do not apply to the overseas
"collectivités" or to New Caledonia, but do apply to the overseas
departments. This means that the reference figure for GHG emissions in
1990---the level from which France must reduce its emissions---does not
account for and does not include emissions from
Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, Mayotte, French Polynesia, Wallis-et-Futuna or
New Caledonia. These territories are excluded from the Kyoto Protocol
and its associated programs regarding emissions. As was the case at
COP 21, the COM entities and New Caledonia must individually agree to
respect the agreements, but their commitment is formulated as part of
their affiliation with France, and not on the international level.

This exclusion from the international scene has consequences for access
to certain sources of international funding such as the Green Climate
Fund intended for Small Island Developing States (SIDS). This fund was
created in 2010 under the UNFCCC to finance projects in developing
countries, in small insular states and in African countries facing the
consequences of climate change. Unlike independent states, the French
overseas territories do not have access to this funding.

Caught in a political limbo, the overseas territories, like other
nonstate entities, try to influence international decision-making on
climate change by participating in side events at COP meetings and in
informal forums.[^57] They follow two principal strategies. The first is
to use their national and EU affiliation to press for financial
resources to confront and adapt to climate change. To this end in 2015
three members of the French Parliament representing overseas territories
submitted a report to the National Assembly prior to the COP 21 meeting.
The authors, Serge Letchimy from Martinique, Ibrahim Aboubaca from
Mayotte and Maïna Sage from Polynesia, described the particular status
of these French territories that suffer the same consequences of climate
change as neighboring countries, but do not have access to the same
types of funding to address the issue.

> "Climate change knows no borders! Our Nation is to be praised for its
> commitment in favor of the most deprived and vulnerable of independent
> States, and thus it is inconceivable that the overseas territories of
> France should be deprived of the same support, considering both the
> extreme environmental and economic vulnerability of these territories,
> and the exceptional benefits derived from their terrestrial and marine
> biodiversity! These lands, which have served the space missions and
> military forces of France, are a major geostrategic asset that deserve
> the full attention of our Country."[^58]

The overseas territories have attempted to obtain the necessary funding
on the basis of their position as French territories. A Green Fund set
up in 2023 to channel 2 billion euros to local authorities in France is
also open to the overseas territories. Among the first 150 projects
selected for funding, 18 involve overseas territories, for a total of
8.5 million euros (Guadeloupe, Martinique, La Réunion, Guyane, Mayotte
and Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon).[^59]

Other initiatives have been taken at the European level. The Association
of Overseas Countries and Territories of the European Union has formed a
working group on the environment to further dialogue on climate change
between the overseas countries and territories and the European
Commission. At the initiative of the French committee of the
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), a dedicated
program for overseas entities called *Biodiversity and Ecosystems
Services in EU Overseas Countries and Territories* (BEST) was launched
in 2011 and funded by the European Union. While several local projects
have been completed under this program, the necessary work of
conservation requires greater financial resources. The French Economic,
Social and Environmental Council, whose members are drawn from civil
society, and which is the third representative body in France, after the
National Assembly and the Senate, came to the same conclusion in a
report on climate justice in 2016. Among its proposals the council calls
for the creation of a dedicated climate justice fund for all the
overseas territories, and adoption of specific targeted solutions when
possible.[^60]

The second strategy of the overseas territories is to build and
participate in alliances and regional coalitions with other independent
countries to gain access to international forums. Since 2006 New
Caledonia and Polynesia have participated in the Pacific Islands Forum.
Martinique is a full-fledged member of the Organisation of Eastern
Caribbean States (OECS) and of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). La
Réunion and Mayotte have joined the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). The
Pacific Islands Forum, CARICOM and IOC have observer status at the
UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties.

The low proportion of overseas emissions in total emissions for France,
the high exposure of overseas territories to the consequences of global
warming, and their poor representation in international decision-making
bodies and instances that oversee environmental protection are the
motives of this call for infranational climate justice. Referring to the
27 principles set out in the Bali Principles of Climate Justice in 2002,
I would like to draw attention to three fundamental aspects of true
climate justice for the overseas territories.[^61]

Principles 3, 19, 20 and 21 "affirm the rights of indigenous peoples and
affected communities to represent and speak for themselves" and "to
participate effectively at every level of decision-making." The
principles "demand that public policies be based on mutual respect and
justice for all peoples, free from any form of discrimination or bias"
and recognize "the right to self-determination of Indigenous Peoples and
their right to control their lands, including sub-surface land" and "the
right to say 'No'" to any action that threatens their territory, culture
or way of life. At present the French overseas territories are not
adequately or specifically represented with respect to the issues of
climate change, whether in scientific forums or political institutions.
These territories' right to sovereignty over their lands remains
contingent on the goodwill of central government in Paris. To ensure
climate justice **the power and right of decision-making must be
recognized** for communities and their land and marine spaces, in each
of the overseas territories*.*

Secondly, principle 7 of the Bali Principles calls for recognition of "a
principle of ecological debt" owed by industrialized countries and
transnational corporations to the rest of the world for their
appropriation of the planet's capacity to absorb greenhouse gases. In
this regard climate justice for the overseas territories would entail
that **France recognize the ecological debt** incurred with these
formerly colonized territories and with its former colonies that are now
independent. In the course of France's long colonial history these lands
have been subject to incessant and extractivist exploitation of their
soils and subsurface resources, biodiversity, ecosystems, and human and
nonhuman living beings*.*

Thirdly, principles 11 and 22 of climate justice call for the
development of renewable energy alternatives to fossil fuels, and for
the recognition of women's rights in the overseas territories. Climate
justice in these territories rests upon **a radical change in energy
policy and for specific measures in favor of women's rights**. These
three points are in my view essential to reaffirm the sacred nature of
Mother Earth and to safeguard the rights of future generations.

# Climate justice or decolonizing climate change?

The quest for infranational climate justice in overseas territories
comes with some problems of its own. The singular form of decolonization
without sovereignty and the assimilationist model of *département*
status granted after 1946 for the purposes of full integration into the
country's administrative structure imposes loss of memory and total
silence regarding the history of slavery and the colonial
relationship.[^62] Does the cause of climate justice for overseas
territories necessarily rest on an implicit validation of the political
relationship between these territories and metropolitan France? Are the
demands underlying the call for climate justice tantamount to acceptance
of the postcolonial relationship? Do they mean all criticism of this
relationship must be muted? Are we obliged to "love France" in order to
insist upon justice in the face of climate change?[^63] Do the overseas
territories and their representatives have no political perspective or
alternative here on Earth other than to forever intone the mantra of
their vulnerability and dependence on metropolitan France? Must they
renounce any desire for sovereignty?[^64] The doubt induced by the idea
that the claim of climate justice for the overseas territories implies
acceptance of the top-down narrative of metropolitan France and its
domination of the overseas lands is compounded by a general notion that
the environmental history of the world and the colonial roots of the
modern world are two separate stories. In this perspective climate
justice is caught in a double bind, which I call the "double
environmental and colonial division of modernity."[^65] This separation
makes it possible to continue to address the three aspects of
infranational climate justice for overseas territories in a purely
technical manner. Accordingly, it is important to distinguish between
the demand for climate justice and the demand for decolonization of
climate change.

In an environmentalist or technicist perspective climate change is
nothing other than the physiochemical process driven by rising GHG
emissions, which are increasing unequally around the globe; it is not
connected to historical and contemporary unequal conditions around the
world. The "political" responses to climate change are similarly
technicist in conception, measured in emissions reductions calibrated in
parts per million, in degrees of temperature, and not in terms of the
nature of relations between human and nonhuman living beings in the
Earth's ecosystems. This is the language used in the COP accords,
reducing the political problem of global warming to an economic policy
for the distribution of emissions quotas authorizing the holders to
continue to release emissions. Paradoxically, even the slogans of
climate movements like "Save the climate!" are underpinned by a
de-politicized understanding that projects the climate as the main actor
on the political stage. In this conception climate justice is reduced to
the arithmetic of emissions weighted by territory, obscuring the
political principle of justice. These emissions equations and slogans
have no political content in relation to feminist, anticapitalist or
anticolonial analyses, nor do they describe the socio-environmental
relationships that link human beings among themselves and with nonhuman
beings. In other words, the injunctions to "save the climate" or to more
equitably distribute GHG emissions contain no political proposal based
on a vision of the future world. This means that climate justice can
continue to be framed in terms that would in no way change the
world---the domination of a group of countries (always the same ones)
over others.

In this technicist perspective the colonial reflex shows through in
recurring comments such as: "Fortunately, to deal with climate change
the overseas territories are French," or "What would they do without
France?" This reaffirms the posture of the entity "France," which after
having plundered the ecosystems of these lands and committed numerous
colonial crimes against their inhabitants, men and women, takes the
stance of a great liberator, and continues to treat the people of the
overseas lands as deficient beings, whose defining trait is to be saved
by the white and innocent hand of France.[^66] Where the overseas
territories are concerned, the aid furnished in the wake of severe
climate events such as hurricanes is not seen as international
cooperation or the solidarity habitually manifested between countries in
the event of natural disasters, large-scale wildfires for instance. On
the contrary, this aid can turn into a reiterated argument to justify
the continuing colonial relationship with the overseas territories and
the representation of their inhabitants as only semi-French underlings
who live in the nether parts of France.

The unspoken colonial attitude and the unease it generates show the
limits of classical approaches to climate justice. These fault lines
demonstrate the necessity not only to achieve climate justice, but, even
more urgently, to decolonize climate change. "Decolonizing climate
change" means first recognizing the colonialism underlying the unequal
contributions of human activities around the world to climate warming,
and the inequitable distribution of the consequences. It means
recognizing the inequitable nature of the place, voice and possibility
of action accorded to different protagonists nationally and
internationally. The call for decolonized thinking about climate change
is a call to join together economic and political measures for emissions
reductions and for building adaptation capacity. It is a call to
reconfigure the politics of the world and to leave behind the period of
modern colonization, and to establish relations between the former
colonizers and colonized peoples, between their social groups, between
the global North and the global South, founded on principles of
equality, justice and dignity. This decolonial movement was first
outlined in the statement of environmental justice principles adopted at
the People of Color Environmental Justice Leadership Summit held in
Washington D.C. in 1991, and which served as a template for the Bali
Climate Justice Principles.[^67] This claim, by its essence, reaches
beyond national borders.

Pending possible changes in the composition of the overseas territories,
decolonization of climate change in the context of France implies a
double epistemic and political shift so that another world can emerge
from the history of colonization and slavery. Two preliminary remarks
are called for here. Firstly, decolonization of thinking about climate
change in France is not an appeal of the so-called "overseas-ers" of
France to be interpreted as a request for assistance or an appeal to
charity. This interpretation would create the impression that once again
this aid or assistance would be of secondary importance in French
climate policy, or could perhaps be dispensed with entirely. Decolonized
thinking about climate change is fundamental to address the social and
economic circumstances of the overseas territories, in the same way that
metropolitan France must address unequal conditions across its own
mainland territory, the divergence between urban areas and rural
regions, the discrimination against women, poor people and people of
color in low-income neighborhoods and towns. Decolonized climate change
is a requisite condition for the development of French climate policy
that can address the stakes of global climate change. Secondly, the
practice of *tokenism* must be banished. It will no longer suffice to
place a handful of people of color in institutional positions to project
a positive image, while preserving intact the historical structure. For
example, although it is symbolically important to have a person of color
and resident of an overseas territory as minister for said territories,
such an appointment in no way alters the structure of postcolonial
relations between metropolitan France and its overseas territories.

Decolonization of thinking about climate change from the vantage point
of France involves a radical and double epistemic shift, in the
comprehension of climate change and in the perception of the French
territory from which and for which its policy is developed. The first
epistemic shift is to reshape the conception of the French national
territory. Far from being a monolithic hexagonal chunk of Europe, France
is country of multiple lands spread across three oceans. Without
recognizing the place, voice and dignity of the overseas inhabitants, we
only perpetuate the hypocritical premises of colonial thinking that
situate the territory within the confines of the mainland, and praise
and uphold the wonderful biodiversity of the overseas lands as
well-deserved trophies. Recognition of the dignity of these men and
women can only come with a strong political and legal engagement in
light of the colonial history and enslavement at the origin of the
relations and situations as they exist today. This recognition must rest
on rest on "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples" set forth in Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, and hence
on the possibility accorded to overseas territories to modify their
status, if they wish, and to accede to full independence and
sovereignty. Recognition that France is state of multiple locations,
built upon a colonial empire of slavery and enslavement, is key to
understanding the geographic situation of France around the world and
the ways in which the country inhabits and lives on Earth, in its
terrestrial dimensions. The question of coming "Down to Earth" is the
title of a well-known work by the late Bruno Latour, philosopher of
science; this line of questioning will always be biased if we ignore the
colonial history which is the point of departure of our world.[^68] We
cannot become terrestrial beings or come "down to earth" without first
establishing a different relationship with the territories which were
subjected to violence that allowed metropolitan France to keep some of
its lands.

The second epistemic shift involves remodeling the political
relationship between the mainland and the overseas lands to take into
account the ecological importance of the latter, and to recognize the
overseas inhabitants as political subjects in their own right at the
regional, national and international levels. The call for a new
political relationship was expressed in the Fort-de-France Declaration
issued by the conference of the presidents of the French regions
Martinique, Guadeloupe, Saint-Martin, Guyane, La Réunion and Mayotte.
These elected officials underscored the "urgent need to enter into a new
stage of history" for the overseas territories and called for "reshaping
the relations between our territories and the French Republic as a
whole, under a newly defined framework for the implementation of public
policies that are aligned with the actual conditions in each of the
territories."[^69]

Along with the economic redistribution necessary to improve living
conditions and respect the fundamental right of overseas inhabitants to
basic services such as access to water and better healthcare
infrastructure, a political relationship must be invented to reflect the
ecological importance of these territories. Considering that the 2.6
million overseas residents have the prime responsibility for 80% of the
ecosystem biodiversity of France, a form of political
representation---environmental democracy or even climate
democracy---must devised that is commensurate with this ecological
resource, if climate change is to be effectively addressed. Many forms
of renewed representation are possible: creation of a parliament of
environmental and ecological matters with a time frame longer than that
of today's institutions; localization of the environment and ecological
transition ministry in Guyane; new parliamentary seats created for
representation devoted to environmental and ecological issues; greater
legislative autonomy for overseas territories; representation of
overseas territories in COP meetings.

Scientific production and access to research must also be rethought and
redistributed under a remodeled relationship. For too long the overseas
territories have been the spaces and objects of colonial and scientific
extractivism, in which scientific research has been carried out neither
by nor for the inhabitants.[^70] Once again, in light of the ecological
significance of these territories and their exposure to climate risks,
these territories and **above all their inhabitants** have fully
legitimate grounds to develop within their territories advanced
scientific facilities in all disciplines to lead research on
environmental and ecological issues. A foundational starting point would
be to provide local residents with automatic funding for Master's degree
studies and doctoral theses in areas of ecological importance, targeting
students from those territories that have suffered from
ecocide---massive and potentially irremediable destruction of
ecosystems---as the result of nuclear weapons testing, mining in New
Caledonia and Guyane, pesticide pollution in Martinique, Guadeloupe and
La Réunion. This would be a step to leave behind the colonialism that
continues to underlie the science of climate change and the status of
overseas territories. In addition to funding, the type of research and
scientific work needed must be rethought, to build research on the
principle of epistemic justice that recognizes the various sources and
forms of production of knowledge.[^71] Revamped research institutions
would recognize the fundamental political and epistemic role that
nonprofit groups and collectives have played in these territories for
over 40 years, in the defense of ecosystems and the conceptualization of
ecological issues. Examples are *Zéro poison--zéro chlordecone* and
*Assaupamar* in Martinique, *Vivre* and *Envie-Santé* in Guadeloupe,
*193* in Polynesia, *Ensemble pour la Planète* in New Caledonia,
*Sillages* in La Réunion and *La Jeunesse autochtone de Guyane* in
Guyane.[^72]

Lastly, to decolonize thinking on climate change from the vantage point
of France also means developing these measures in the broader framework
of justice and reparations for the crimes of slavery and colonization.
The African American philosopher Olúfémie Táíwò has shown that a policy
of reparations for slavery and colonization cannot be implemented
without some form of climate justice.[^73] The other side of the coin is
just as important. Following through on earlier proposals, I think
climate justice cannot be envisioned without reparations for the
historic crimes of colonization and slavery.[^74] Before they came to be
presented as areas of ecological importance for France, these spaces
were sacrificial zones for France, where ceaseless exploitation of human
and nonhuman beings knew no limits.[^75] Let us remember that the last
round of nuclear weapons testing in France was conducted in 1996, four
years after France had signed the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change.[^76] To this day France as never had to answer for these
colonial and postcolonial crimes. How can the country loudly and proudly
claim, with white innocence, its oversight of the ecosystems of these
territories, without at the same time recognizing the long colonial
history of predatory and dehumanizing acts perpetrated on the people of
these lands?[^77] The logical conclusion is that we cannot decolonize
climate change or climate justice in France without at the same time
decolonizing France itself, without reinventing the political image of
the nation, and its cultural, scientific and political institutions, and
its very ways of living on Earth. The stakes are quite literally to
build a new world in the wake of colonization and slavery.

# A world beyond overseas

We address one final, and fundamental, issue in our conclusion. As
mentioned above, the term "overseas" in itself expresses the perspective
of the historical colonial empire of France. Likewise, the necessary
decolonization of change cannot be confined within the national borders
of the country. It would be inconsistent to propose a decolonial
politics of climate change delimited by the geographic boundaries
decreed by a former colonial power. In the face of global warming
metropolitan France and the French overseas territories are subject to
unequal and discriminatory degrees of contribution, exposure and
vulnerability. This characteristically imbalanced relationship, the
heritage of the long colonial history of modernity, is found all around
the world. Decolonizing the politics of climate change from the vantage
point of France means, paradoxically, moving beyond the infranational
channels of communication and exchange between the overseas territories
and metropolitan France. Decolonizing climate change politics **from**
the various overseas territories is a process that must necessarily
pursue dialogue, talks and alliances among at least four distinct types
and forms of nonsovereign territories around the world.

Far from being a singular feature of France, the French overseas
territories belong to an ensemble of overseas territories around the
world that were, wholly or in part, appropriated in the course of
colonization and armed conquest led by a host of countries: the Kingdom
of the Netherlands, the United States, Denmark, the United Kingdom,
Finland, Norway, China, South Korea, New Zealand and Australia.[^78]
These "overseas" lands include: Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Samoa,
the Mariana Islands and Guam (United States); Aruba, Bonaire,
Saint-Eustache, Saba, Curaçao and Sint-Marteen (Netherlands); Anguilla,
Montserrat, the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Turks and
Caicos, Bermuda, the Pitcairn Islands, the Falkland Islands and Saint
Helena (United Kingdom); the Faroe Islands and Greenland (Denmark); the
Cook Islands and Tokelau (New Zealand). Most of these nonsovereign
territories are situated in tropical latitudes, and are characterized by
exceptional biodiversity, and also by high exposure to the consequences
of climate change. Certain territories, such as Greenland, have become
strategic locations for scientific work to track and understand climate
change. But it is rarely, if ever, mentioned that Greenland is a
nonsovereign territory of over 50,000 inhabitants, including the
Tunumiit people. Like the French overseas territories, these territories
have contributed little to climate change, and are subject to similar
constraints of territorial inequality and political and juridical
marginalization within their tutelary states. These relationships are
described by Daphina Misiedjan for the overseas territories of the
Netherlands.[^79]

Secondly there are also territories inhabited by Indigenous peoples
under governments with varying degrees of political and legislative
autonomy. These territories include those of: the Lakota and Sioux
Nations in the United States; Guarani, Krenak and numerous maroon
communities in Brazil; the Kalina and Boni people in Guiana: the
Saramaka in Surinam; the Walpiri and Mangala in Australia; the Lenka in
Honduras; the Baks and Twa in the Republic of Congo; the Ogoni in
Nigeria; the Sami in Norway; the Nun First Nations in Canada; the Kanak
in New Caledonia/Kanaky; and the Maohi in Polynesia. These territories
can be visualized on a global scale in the map published by Native Land
Digital.[^80] These peoples who have done little to contribute to
climate change are today exposed to its consequences, even as they
struggle with precarious social conditions in their countries, and are
marginalized by their tutelary governmental authorities and on the
international scene.

A third group is composed of territories that are nominally independent
and sovereign states, but which are mired in various forms of dependence
and economic and political domination in relation to their former
colonial central power. This domination takes of the form of secret
pacts such as the ties of "France-Afrique" that bind former French
colonies in sub-Saharan Africa to the countries of the North and
international bodies such as the World Bank, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).[^81] As
decolonial and anticolonial thinkers Anibal Quijano, Walter Mignolo,
Catherine Walsh, Arturo Escobar, Walter Rodney, Macarena Gomez and many
others have shown, the colonial relationships forged in the times of
colonization and slavery persist even in the wake of independence, in
the ways people and governments relate to each other, in the
understanding of power, in knowledge, in ways of being and of living on
Earth, and even in ways of protecting the environment.[^82] These
territories are independent by statute, with their own political and
legislative organization. The neoliberal regime of international markets
and government by debt impose constraints on these countries that in
effect impinge on their sovereignty. This situation is particularly
problematic for Small Island Developing States (SIDS). From Barbados to
Tuvalu, from Mauritius to Samoa, the small island states of the second
wave of decolonization in the second half of the 20^th^ century are also
caught up in a situation of political and economic disadvantage and
inequality on the international capitalist chess board, even as they are
among the first to confront the impacts of climate change.

Finally, poor urban neighborhoods and districts in the so-called North
countries are particularly exposed and vulnerable to the consequences of
climate change, e.g. heat waves. These territories---often home to
people of color who themselves or whose families emigrated from former
colonies in the postcolonial period---are representative of another form
of nonsovereignty. Ostracized by a sort of environmental apartheid,
these residents, exemplified by the population of the Seine--Saint-Denis
*département* adjacent to Paris in the Île-de-France region in France,
are not seen as political agents in their own right, able to elaborate
their own conception of the world and of the Earth, and their own
environmental and ecological vision.[^83]

These overseas entities---overseas territories within sovereign
countries, Indigenous peoples' lands, small island countries, and poor
neighborhoods---can for the most part be characterized as follows.
Although historically they have contributed little to global warming,
they are disproportionally exposed to the consequences of climate
change. Additionally, they are more economically, socially and
ecologically vulnerable than other countries. These territories have
historically been colonized under the former empires of Western
countries, and remain marginalized within their own states and on the
international scene of climate change talks. The inequalities of climate
change impacts follow, to some extent, the fault lines of the colonial
fracture in the modern history of the West, both in the causes and
consequences of climate change and in the national and international
bodies and forums where climate policy is constructed. Recognizing this
history would constitute a profound modification of how climate change
is perceived and how we respond to it.

In short, the global climate crisis cannot be resolved without full
decolonization of the Western world. We cannot invent a shared world to
face the disruption that is already under way without full, equal and
respectful participation accorded to all the innumerable voices of the
Earth. These voices are raised day after day to remind us of the
existential failure of the colonial vision of the West, and they carry
the powerful and exigent song of the quest for equality, liberty and
dignity.

[^1]: Roberts, Timmons and Bradley, Park, *A climate of injustice:
    global inequality, North-South politics, and climate policy*,
    Cambridge, MIT Press, 2006; Roberts, Timmons et al., "Climate
    justice and inequality" in Dunlap, Riley and Brulle, Robert (eds.),
    *[Society and climate change: sociological
    perspectives](https://www.worldcat.org/fr/title/915680477),* New
    York, Oxford University Press, 2015*,* p. 127--165.

[^2]: Field, Christopher et al. (eds.), "IPCC, 2014: Summary for
    Policymakers, in *Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and
    vulnerability. Part A: global and sectoral aspects. Contribution of
    Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the
    Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,* Cambridge, Cambridge
    University Press, 2014, p. 3.

[^3]: Achiume, E. Tendayi, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on
    contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and
    related intolerance, E. Tendayi Achiume - Ecological crisis, climate
    justice and racial justice.* United Nations General Assembly, 77^th^
    session, 25 October 2022.

[^4]: *Jugement n° 1904967-1904968-1904972-1904976 du Tribunal de
    Paris*, 14 October 2021,
    [[http://paris.tribunal-administratif.fr/content/download/184990/1788790/version/1/file/1904967BIS.pdf]{.underline}](http://paris.tribunal-administratif.fr/content/download/184990/1788790/version/1/file/1904967BIS.pdf).

[^5]: Défenseur des Droits (France), *Rapport. discriminations et
    origines : l'urgence d'agir,* 2020.

[^6]: "*[UN rights office calls on France to address 'deep issues' of
    racism in policing](https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1138247),*"
    ONU Info, 30 June 2023,
    <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1138247>*.*

[^7]: "Chiffres du ministère des outre-mer", *Le ministre de
    l'Outre-mer*, 21 July 2023, https://www.outre-mer.gouv.fr/.

[^8]: Article 73 of the French Constitution (4 October 1958).

[^9]: Article 74 of the French Constitution (4 October 1958).

[^10]: Faberon, Jean-Yves and Ziller, Jacques, *Droits des collectivités
    d'outre-mer*, Manuels, Paris, 2007; M'Saïdié, Thomas and Ziller,
    Jacques, *Les pays et territoires d'outre-mer dans l'Union
    européenne*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2013.

[^11]: "United Nations and Decolonization; Non-Self-Governing
    Territories," United Nations,
    <https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/nsgt> (updated 4 August
    2023). See Ferdinand, Malcom, "Entretien avec Oscar Temaru et Moetai
    Brotherson," in Manglou, Mélissa and Ferdinand, Malcom (eds.),
    *Écologie et Politique : Écologies politiques depuis les outre-mer,*
    vol. 63, Latresne, Le Bord de l'eau, 2021, p.137-148.

[^12]: Resolution A/RES31/4 adopted by the General Assembly of the
    United Nations on 21 October 1976 during its 31st session, on the
    question of the Comorian island of Mayotte. See Idriss, Mamaye, *Le
    combat pour Mayotte française : 1958-1976,* Paris, Khartala, 2018.

[^13]: Quijano, Aníbal, "Colonialidad del poder, eurocentrismo y América
    Latina," in Lander, Edgardo (ed.),* La colonialidad del saber:
    eurocentrismo y ciencias sociales,* Buenos Aires, CLACSO, 2000,
    p. 202; Morrison, Toni, *Playing in the dark: whiteness and the
    literary imagination,* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1999.

[^14]: Léobal, Clémence, *Ville noire, pays Blanc : Habiter et lutter en
    Guyane française*, Lyon, Presses Universitaires de Lyon,
    2022. Brunetaux, Patrick and Pulvar, Olivier, *Les Métropolitains à
    la Martinique : une migration de confort,* Fort-de-France, K.
    éditions, 2022. Zecler, Michel, *Rester debout,* Paris, Plon, 2021.
    Beauvallet, Willy, Célestine, Audrey and Roger, Aurélie (eds.),
    "L'État outre-mer. La construction sociale et institutionnelle d'une
    spécificité ultramarine," *Politix*, vol. 116, n° 4, 2016,
    p. 139-161. Marboeuf, Olivier, *Suites décoloniales : s'enfuir de la
    plantation,* Rennes, Éditions du Commun, 2022. Niang, Mame-Fatou,
    *Identités françaises : banlieues, féminités et universalisme,*
    Leiden, Brill-rodopi, 2020.

[^15]: Larcher, Syliane, *L'autre citoyen : l'idéal républicain et les
    Antilles après l'esclavage*, Paris, Points, 2022 \[2014\].

[^16]: Garde, François, *Petit éloge de l'outre-mer,* Paris, Gallimard,
    2018.

[^17]: Manglou, Mélissa, and Ferdinand, Malcom, "Penser l'écologie
    politique depuis les outre-mer français" in Manglou, Mélissa and
    Ferdinand, Malcom (eds.), op. cit., p.11-26.

[^18]: Gardiner, Stephen, "Climate justice" in Dryzek, John, Norgaard,
    Richard, and Schlosberg, David (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of
    Climate Change and Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

[^19]: Schlosberg, David, *Defining Environmental Justice: Theories,
    Movements, and Nature*, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 2007,
    p. 79--99.

[^20]: Baptiste, Karen, and Rhiney, Kevon, "Climate justice and the
    Caribbean," *Geoforum*, vol. 73, 2016, p. 17-80. Perry, Keston,
    "(Un)Just transitions and Black dispossession: The disposability of
    Caribbean 'refugees' and the political economy of climate
    justice," *Politics*, vol. 43, N°2, 2023, p.169--185. Sheller, Mimi,
    *Island Futures: Caribbean Survival in the Anthropocene,* Durham,
    Duke University Press, 2020. Sealy-Huggins, Leon, " '1.5°C to stay
    alive': climate change, imperialism and justice for the Caribbean,"
    *Third World Quarterly,* vol. 38, N°11, p. 2444--2463.

[^21]: Data obtained from the Flanders Marine Institute (2016).
    *Maritime boundaries geodatabase: maritime boundaries and exclusive
    economic zones (200NM)*, version 9.
    [[http://www.marineregions.org]{.underline}](http://www.marineregions.org)
    and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (2018). *The World Factbook*.
    https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bb.html.

[^22]: Barrett, Sam, "Subnational climate justice? Adaptation finance
    distribution and climate vulnerability," *World Development*, 58,
    2014, p.130-142.

[^23]: Ferdinand, Malcom, *Penser l'écologie depuis le monde caribéen*,
    Paris, Seuil, 2019, p. 51-68.

[^24]: This data does not include emissions due to international air and
    maritime travel and shipping (as agreed under the UN Framework
    Convention on Climate Change). This means that travel and shipping
    between metropolitan France and its overseas territories are not
    counted for the purposes of emissions reduction targets. Likewise,
    emissions from the COM territories and New Caledonia are not
    included in the official total of French GHG emissions. In this
    article they are counted.

[^25]: My own compilation based on inventories of GHG emissions and
    atmospheric pollutants, and atmospheric emissions data from CITEPA
    (2022 and 2023), available at
    https://www.citepa.org/fr/publications/.

[^26]: Bareigt, Ericka and Fasquelle, Daniel, *Rapport d'information sur
    l'adaptation du droit de l'énergie aux outre-mer*, Paris: Assemblée
    Nationale, 2014.

[^27]: Rimane, Davey and Ratenon, Jean-Hugues, *Rapport d'information
    sur l'autonomie énergétique en outre-mer*, Paris, Assemblée
    Nationale, 2023.

[^28]: Figures from the following sources: Observatoire de l'énergie ---
    Direction de l'Industrie, des Mines et de l'Energie de la
    Nouvelle-Calédonie --- 2021. Belfort, Amélie, *Bilan de
    l'Énergie 2021,* Observatoire Régionale de l'énergie et du climat de
    Guadeloupe, 28 September 2022. Sylvestre-Baron, Teiki, *Bilan
    énergétique polynésie française : édition 2019,* Observatoire
    Polynésien de l'énergie and ADEME Polynésie française, 28 February
    2021. Hoarau, Mathieu, *Bilan énergétique Réunion : les chiffres
    clés 2022,* SPL Horizon Réunion, 2023. "Bilans énergétiques des
    départements d'outre-mer de 2013 à 2020," *Données et études
    statistiques*, Ministère de la transition écologique, 14 April 2022.

[^29]: Andrieux, Virginie, Meillac, Christophe and Mesqui, Bérangère
    (ed.), *Chiffres clés de l'énergie : édition 2022*, Services des
    Données et Études de la Statistique, November 2022.

[^30]: Observatoire National sur les Effets du Réchauffement Climatique
    (ONERC), *Les outre-mer face au défi du changement climatique :
    Rapport au premier ministre et au parlement*, Paris, La
    Documentation française, 2013, p. 28.

[^31]: ONERC, op. 32.

[^32]: ONERC, op. cit., p. 34.

[^33]: "Le réchauffement climatique observé à l'échelle du globe et en
    France," *Météo France*, 7 August 2015,
    http://www.meteofrance.fr/climat-passe-et-futur/le-rechauffement-observe-a-l-echelle-du-globe-et-en-france.

[^34]: Walsh, Kevin et al., "Tropical cyclones and climate change,"
    *WIREs Climate Change*, vol.7, N°1, p. 65-89. Knutson, Thomas et
    al., "Tropical Cyclones and Climate Change Assessment: Part II:
    Projected Response to Anthropogenic Warming," in *Bull. Amer.
    Meteor. Soc.*, vol.101, 2020, p. E303 -- E322.

[^35]: Ayyad, Mahmoud, Hajj, Muhammed, and Marsooli, Resa, "Climate
    change impact on hurricane storm surge hazards in New York/New
    Jersey Coastlines using machine-learning," in *npj Climate and
    Atmospheric Science,* vol.6, N°88, 2023.

[^36]: Hau'ofa, Epeli, *Notre mer d'îles,* (translated by. G. Colombani,
    T. Isselé and S. Massau), Arue, Pacific Islanders Éditions, 2013.

[^37]: Lallemant-Moe, Hervé Raimana, "Les défis territoriaux et spatiaux
    des changements climatiques pour les territoires du Pacifique," in
    Manglou, Mélissa and Ferdinand, Malcom (eds.), op. cit*.*,
    p.125-131.

[^38]: Gargominy, Olivier, and Boquet, Aurélie, *Biodiversité
    d'outre-mer*. Paris, Comité Français, UICN, 2013. The measurement
    and metrics of biodiversity are much more complex than simple
    percentages, and merit discussion in a separate article. The figures
    given here are not meant to slight the importance of France's
    European ecosystems, but to underscore the richness of ecosystems in
    the so-called overseas territories.

[^39]: ONERC, *Les outre-mer face au défi du changement climatique :
    Rapport au premier ministre et au parlement*, Paris, La
    Documentation française, 2013, p. 49.

[^40]: Initiative française pour les Récifs CORalliens (IFRECOR),
    "Récifs coralliens les joyaux de l'outre-mer," *Ifrecor*, 3 Juy
    2011, http://www.ifrecor.com/recifs-coralliens.html.

[^41]: Ferdinand, Malcom, *Une écologie décoloniale*, p. 51-68.

[^42]: "Taux de chômage localisés par sexe et âge en moyenne annuelle en
    2022 Comparaisons régionales et départementales," INSEE*,* 25 May
    2023,
    [<https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2134411#tableau-TCRD_087_tab1_regions2016> ]{.underline}.
    Jonzo, Anne, "2000 emplois de moins qu'avant la crise sanitaire et
    forte hausse du chômage Enquête Emploi 2022 à Mayotte," INSEE,
    9 February 2023,
    [<https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/6798031> ]{.underline}.
    Dukunengo, Annette, "Synthèse, Enquête force de travail 2022,"
    *Institut de la Statistique et études économiques Nouvelle-Calédonie
    (ISEE*), août 2023,
    https://www.isee.nc/emploi-revenus/emploi-conditions-de-travail/emploi-chomage.

[^43]: "L'emploi progresse en 2022, le nombre d'inactifs ne souhaitant
    pas travailler également,"*, Institut de la Statistique Polynésienne
    (ISPF*), 30 December 2022, https://www.ispf.pf/publication/1359.

[^44]: Grangé, Claire, "Le taux de pauvreté reste stable en 2018 à La
    Réunion," *INSEE Flash Réunion,* 28 January 2021,
    www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/5016838.

[^45]: Patent, George, "Sincérité des taux de pauvreté en outre-mer,"
    *Sénat : questions écrites,* 28 February 2019,
    https://www.senat.fr/questions/base/2019/qSEQ190209202.html.

[^46]: Méjean, Caroline et al. (ed.), *Alimentation et nutrition dans
    les départements et régions d'outre-mer*, IRD Éditions, Marseille,
    2020, p. 106.

[^47]: *Rapport: Service public aux Antilles : garantir l'accès aux
    droits*, Paris, Défenseur des droits, 2023.

[^48]: William, Jean-Claude, Reno, Fred, and Alvarez, Fabienne (eds.),
    *Mobilisations sociales aux Antilles : les événements de 2009 dans
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    et en Martinique,* Paris, La Découverte, 2019.

[^49]: Loi n° 2017-256 du 28 février 2017 de programmation relative à
    l'égalité réelle outre-mer et portant autres dispositions en matière
    sociale et économique.

[^50]: Footprint Data Foundation, York University Ecological Footprint
    Initiative, and Global Footprint Network: National Footprint and
    Biocapacity Accounts, 2023 edition, data.footprintnetwork.org/#/.

[^51]: Bareigts, Ericka and Fasquelle, Daniel, op. cit*.*, p. 9.

[^52]: Pastel, Audrey and Saffache, Pascal, "Le plan de prévention des
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[^53]: Malcom, Ferdinand, "Toxic Time-scape & the Double Fracture of
    Modernity: Chlordecone Contamination of Martinique and Guadeloupe,"
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    Examining Toxicity across Time and Space*, Ohio University Press,
    2023 p. 253--284.

[^54]: Feuillet, Nathalie et al., "Birth of a large volcanic edifice
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[^55]: Gayatri, Spivak, "Can the subaltern speak?" in Nelson, Carry and
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[^56]: Fricker, Miranda, *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of
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[^57]: Schroeder, Helke, and Lovell, Heather, "The role of
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[^58]: Sage, Maina, Aboubacar, Ibrahim, and Letchimy, Serge, *Rapport
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[^59]: "Découvrez les premiers lauréats du fond vert dans vos régions,"
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[^60]: Jouzel, Jean, and Michelot, Agnès, *La justice climatique :
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[^61]: International Climate Justice Network, "Bali Principles of
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[^62]: Cottias, Myriam, "L'oubli du passé contre la"citoyenneté": troc
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[^65]: Ferdinand, Malcom, *Une écologie décoloniale,* op. cit*.,*
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[^67]: "Principles of Environmental Justice," Washington DC, 1991,
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[^68]: Latour, Bruno, *Où atterrir : comment s'orienter en politique,*
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[^69]: "Appel de Fort-de-France," *France Info,* 18 May 2022,
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[^72]: Cabanes, Valérie, *Un nouveau droit pour la Terre,* Paris, Point,
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[^73]: Táíwò, Olúfẹ́mi, *Reconsidering reparations: worldmaking in the
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[^74]: Ferdinand, Malcom, *une écologie décoloniale,* op. cit.*,*
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[^75]: Lopes de Souza, Marcelo, " 'Sacrifice zone': The
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[^78]: Ferdinand, Malcom, Oostindie, Geert and Veenendaal, Wouter, op.
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[^79]: Misiedajn, Daphina, "Separate but equal in the protection against
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[^80]: Map available here https://native-land.ca/

[^81]: Thomas Borrel, Amzat Boukari-Yabara, Benoît Collombat (eds.),
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